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Whilst the notion of a creating a ‘cloudless sky’ by 
moving control and processing to the edge of the 
network, i.e. mobile devices, provides greater agency 
to users over the handling of their data, it still exists 
within a privately controlled networked infrastructure. 
Infrastructure can thus be considered the elephant in 
the room or in this case cloudless sky. In this paper, we 
address the elephant by considering a more radical and 
perhaps utopian perspective of providing greater user 
agency over the networked infrastructure itself.  
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Introduction 
Mobile interactive systems are fundamentally 
dependent on mobile network infrastructure. In this 
paper, the term ‘infrastructure’ includes physical 
infrastructure, such as base stations, as well as 
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 institutional infrastructure, such as private mobile 
companies. This mobile network infrastructure is in turn 
shaped by the economic ideologies where it exists. 
Most, if not all states, have chosen to nationalise or 
privatise mobile network infrastructure. In neoliberal 
capitalist parlance, privatisation is also associated with 
liberalisation. A third option would be to ‘commonise’ 
this infrastructure. To commonise means to treat the 
infrastructure as a common good that is controlled by 
its users. This paper considers the potential to 
commonise mobile network infrastructure and argues 
that this task is an alternative way to address the aims 
of this workshop of greater agency for users. 
 
Current mobile network infrastructure 
Control over the means of production matters in 
economics. The means of production for mobile 
interactive systems is not only the devices and software 
that enable users to interact but also the infrastructure. 
Whilst a shift towards edge computing, as opposed to 
cloud-based computing services, offers considerable 
advantages in relation to data handling, there is still 
the fact that if such systems are to be scalable they will 
still be dependent on mobile network infrastructure. 
Whilst it is convenient to consider mobile networks as 
simple ‘bit pipes’ though which data is transferred 
unmolested, they are essentially private networks 
ultimately under the control of their operators and 
sanctioned by the nation states in which they reside. 
 
To underscore this point, there were at least 196 
internet shutdowns in 2019, primarily at the behest of 
states rather than markets [1]. In India, most of these 
shutdowns were administered locally rather than 
nationally, which suggests the type of system 
(nationalised, privatised, commonised) might be the 
independent variable rather than blanket 
decentralisation [2]. China’s tightly controlled state 
mobile network infrastructure is well known, tolerated, 
and even catered to by open societies like the US. 
China’s successful nationalised mobile network 
infrastructure also shines as a beacon for aspiring 
authoritarian states like Russia [3]. In the US, the 
ongoing battle over net neutrality as well as the very 
recent scuffle over TikTok illustrates the precariousness 
of user control over mobile interactive systems. It’s 
easy to imagine a dystopian future in which China ships 
a compromised infrastructure to other states. But what 





Figure 2 Generalised Mobile Network Infrastructure 
Figure 1. Elephant in our 
cloudless sky 
 With respect to decentralisation of commonised 
systems, most scholarly research is agnostic of the 
network on which it resides. The most robust research 
on issues such as user incentives and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) communication protocols has focused on file 
sharing sites like Napster [4], knowledge commonses 
like Wikipedia [5], and emerging blockchain products 
like Backfeed [6]. The reality is that these P2P services 
are reliant on mobile infrastructure as even two devices 
located in the same cell passing data to each other 
would still be transferred through the network 
infrastructure as shown in Figure 2. Even if P2P 
interaction is potentially performed device to device 
and separated from mobile infrastructure (shown at 
bottom of the figure) using wireless technologies such 
as Bluetooth or Direct WiFi, the scalability of such 
systems is highly problematic. As such it might be 
considered the elephant in our supposed cloudless sky. 
 
The commons and commonised 
infrastructure 
The dominant approach of states either to nationalise 
or to privatise their mobile network infrastructures yield 
pervasive challenges regarding resilience, 
transparency, and user control. This paper explores a 
third option, which is to commonise mobile network 
infrastructure. Successfully commonised resources 
include natural resources like fisheries, digital resources 
like Wikipedia, and physical resources like prosthetic 
limbs. Mobile network infrastructure represents an 
intersection of natural resources (mobile frequencies), 
digital resources (system account management), and 
physical resources (e.g. base stations). 
 
The term commonise is derived from the literature 
regarding the creation and management of common 
goods (the commons). Whilst the commons plays an 
economic role that predates capitalism by millennia, the 
role of common goods and their governance only 
received serious scholarly attention from the 1990s, 
when Ostrom published Governing the Commons. 
Ostrom demonstrated that sometimes natural 
resources like fisheries and irrigation systems could be 
better managed by users than by either the market or 
the state [7]. Scholars have since extended analysis of 
commons management to the digital realm, such as 
Wikipedia and blockchain products. While scholars vary 
in how they situate the commons and commons 
governance — from a system that is now embedded 
within capitalism to a competing economic ideology 
that could displace capitalism as a dominant economic 
system — the defining feature of a commons is that 
users govern the resource. Consequently, to 
commonise an infrastructure means to place it under 
the control and governance of the users of that 
infrastructure. 
 
Ostrom identified eight design principles of successful 
commonses that have endured decades of scholarly 
examination, shown in Figure 3 [8]. This paper focuses 
specifically on design principle #4: ‘Make sure the rule-
making rights of community members are respected by 
outside authorities’. The logic of this design principle 
underpins privatisation as much as commonisation. To 
privatise mobile networks, the rule-making rights 
(governance) of the community members (the private 
sector) are respected by the outside authorities (the 
state). This security of tenure provides the incentive to 
the private sector to invest in the infrastructure. There 
is no known example of a state awarding such rule-
making rights to citizens or a group of citizens 
regarding mobile network infrastructure. 
1. Define clear group 
boundaries. 
2. Match rules governing use 
of common goods to local 
needs and conditions. 
3. Ensure that those affected 
by the rules can participate in 
modifying the rules. 
4. Make sure the rule-making 
rights of community 
members are respected by 
outside authorities. 
5. Develop a system, carried 
out by community members, 
for monitoring members’ 
behavior. 
6. Use graduated sanctions 
for rule violators. 
7.Provide accessible, low-cost 
means for dispute resolution. 
8. Build responsibility for 
governing the common 
resource in nested tiers from 
the lowest level up to the 
entire interconnected system. 
Figure 3. Design Principles for 
Commonses 
 A commonised mobile network 
infrastructure 
What would a commonised mobile network 
infrastructure look like? There are three common goods 
that comprise this infrastructure:  
 Natural, the limited mobile frequencies that can be 
used; 
 Physical, the base stations and other physical 
infrastructure; and 
 Digital, what is created to manage communication 
and governance. 
 
Within the scope of this short paper, we have chosen to 
respond to design principle #4 which generates the 
question: How might the state ensure the rule-making 
rights of citizens for a commonised mobile network 
infrastructure?  If we created a mobile network 
infrastructure from scratch, we might dedicate a 
frequency as a public frequency, in the manner of 
public broadcasting. A more feasible approach now 
might be the combination of ‘piggybacking’ and social 
policy modeled on affordable housing. Piggybacking is a 
common practice in which private companies buy space 
from one of the principal mobile network companies 
and offer that service under their own brand. For 
example, in the UK, Tesco Mobile piggybacks on O2 and 
Virgin Mobile piggybacks on EE. A commonised mobile 
network infrastructure can piggyback off of the existing 
operators, but what about ensuring equal quality? A 
downside of piggybacking is that the primary providers 
privilege their customers over the piggybacking brands. 
A design solution to this problem might be modeled on 
affordable housing policy. In many states, private 
companies must set aside a proportion of units as 
affordable housing. This policy is part of a social 
contract in most capitalist states. In short, all of society 
has created the opportunity for the private company to 
make money by creating housing, and in return the 
private company must create housing for all of society. 
 
Understandably in such a brief paper we have left many 
questions about how this commonised network can 
flourish. For example, the general logic of states who 
privatised mobile frequencies was that market 
operators would invest in the mobile network 
infrastructure if they possessed security of possession. 
We must equally ask this question for commonised 
infrastructure. If we want to provide incentives for 
citizens to invest in mobile infrastructure, what security 
of possession can be offered? 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst this paper offers no real solutions, we feel we 
may at least start the debate of what is the underlying 
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